A Lumper's Story: the THe and its Affiliates
Cathy Brigden
RMIT University

The 1998 waterfront dispute has had a number of consequences, not
the least being the demonstration of inter-union solidarity. It was a
dispute that saw not just a union and an employer (and a government)
challenging each other, but a dispute involving the union movement.
The community assembly at Melbourne's East Swanson dock became
the gathering place for unionists across the spectrum, . It was not
just the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) challenging Patrick's,
Reith and co, but the union movement, responding to the attack on
one of its own, most dramatically seen on the night of I 8 April. The
solidarity expressed ~ visually, aurally [the chant of 'MUA ~ here to
stay'] - spoke of the collective, the unity on which the union
movement is founded.
The 'ties that bind' were in obvious evidence - and in Victoria,
the state's peak union body, the Trades Hall Council (THC) played a
significant mobilising role in assisting the MUA. It was the voices
of Leigh Hubbard, THC Secretary, and Martin Kingham, THC
President, which were heard down at the wharf, day in day out. This
glimpse ofthe THC highlights the role of the THC - the role it plays
in the union movement. It focuses our attention on the unifYing role
that inter-union bodies can play - their industrial, political and, most
clearly in this instance, mobilising role.
These bodies can, quite clearly, be sites of expressed solidarity.
Some accounts of these bodies, however, use very different terms.
For example, Mark Leier (1995) in his book exploring labour
bureaucracy through an analysis of the Vancouver Trades and Labour
Council describes his analysis as that of a 'splitter'. He draws on
Lizabeth Cohen (from I.H. Hexter, 1975, who in turn used the terms
coined by a colleague, Duncan Kagan) who contrasted historians as
either 'splitters' or 'lumpers'. Where splitters explored divisions in
the working class, lumpers explored unifYing factors and similarities.
While Leier observed that, "My own preference, by temperament
and experience, is to examine the divisions in the working class [and
that What] was noticeable [about working class culture] and needed
examination were the forces that kept workers from uniting (1995,
p. 9)", Cohen stated that: "I am interested in diversity in behaviour
and attitudes, but I set about identifying it by constructing
comparisons of groups I perceive to be homogenous and distinctive"
(1991, p. 598) - or, as can be said, 'the ties that bind'. This is not to
say that the two are mutually exclusive. Cohen argues, and Leier
agrees, that "lumping must come first for splitting to have value"
(Cohen, 1991, p. 598; Leier, 1995, p. 9). Cannon says every historian
must be both splitter and lumper: what he calls the synthesiser and
the demolition man [sic], "those who construct patterns and theories
and those who destroy them" (Cannon, 1980, p. 3).
This is a 'lumper's' story of the THC, which includes an
exploration of both tendencies towards lumping and splitting within
the THC and between the THe and its affiliates over the period 19481974. In the THe we have an inter-union body, an institution which
reflects lumping, indeed its very raison d'efre being the expression
oflumping. Any analysis of this body must also, though, make sense
of the clear and obvious instances of splitting, as occurred in 194851 and more dramatically in 1967-73, where the mass suspensions
were actually referred to as 'the split' in the THC. These
experiences mean that splitting cannot be ignored, and that
these cleavages and their causes must be understood.

Nevertheless, in these cases, the forces for lumping prevailed. The
splits, while traumatic, were not permanent and the THC remained a
force for mobilising solidarity in the union movement. The maritime
dispute reminds us of this force of unity.
To unpack both the forces for lumping and the splitting in the
THC, the relations between the THC and affiliates will be examined
through analysis of the THC itself and four affiliates. Here the role
of the THC from the perspective of unions can be explored and
different patterns of interaction can be seen. We can see the relations
between particular union officials and the THC leadership. This
approach does attempt to mediate against reification of the THC,
and to enable some sense of agency. The impact of changes of
leadership on the nature ofthe THC can be seen, for example, in the
mid 1960s after the death oflong-time Secretary Stout. The forces
behind splitting and lumping require an explicit analysis in terms of
power relations as well as the intersection of factionalism and
ideology. Much splitting and lumping draws on ideology as an
explanation, justification or rationalisation or guiding principle, whilst
factionalism provides impetus for both splitting and lumping: factions
in themselves provide a forum for expressions of lumping, but
factional differences and conflict promote the potential for splitting.
This paper canvasses some of the key themes in the literature on
inter-union bodies, and begins an exploration of power drawing on
Hyman's construction of 'power over' and 'power for'. This will be
used to explore the power relations within the THC and between the
THC and its affiliates, with examples drawn from the I 950s and
19608.

Turning briefly to the literature on inter-union bodies, a number
of patterns can be discerned. One is the lack of both empirical and
theoretical studies, a pattern found both in the Australian and overseas
literature. A second is the emphasis in the theoretical works on the
notion and nature of authority. In the Australian literature this study
of authority has primarily taken the form of analysis of the national
peak union body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)
with relatively little attention given to inter-union bodies at other
levels (see Martin, 1962; Dabscheck, 1977; Griffin, 1994; exceptions
include Markey, 1994, and Ellem and Shields, 1996).
In many ways, the theoretical vacuum in the Australian literature
surrounding inter-union bodies should not be surprising, as it
replicates the general lack of union theory and the still under-explored
area of union strategy (see Gardner, 1989). The influence of Howard's
'dependency thesis' has almost been a dead hand on the development
of union theory in Australia (Howard, 1977; see Gahan, 1996, for an
assessment of the validity of the dependency thesis). The elevation
of arbitration as 'the' explanatory factor certainly constrains analysis
of bodies not primarily fixated by this form of dispute resolution
(such as theTHC and unions operating in the wages board system of
Victoria, for instance).
In the overseas empirical studies of inter-union bodies, the focus
is more on relations between inter-union bodies, that is, national
bodies over inter-union bodies at state, province or city level.
Commonly the story is one of subordination of lower level interunion bodies by national peak bodies . These patterns of
authority are furthermore complicated by ideological tussles,
pointing out the added layers of power relations that must be
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explored, not just within, but between inter-union bodies (see Stevens,
1997 and Clinton, 1977 on the British Trades Union Congress and
trades councils and Taft, 1957 on the American Federation of Labor
and Congress ofIndustrial Organisations and state affiliates).
Another clear pattern is the elevation of the political role over
the industrial role of inter-union bodies, a significant theme found in
both the Australian and overseas literature (see Taft, 1968 and
WaHihan, 1985 in the US; O'Connor, 1989 in Ireland; Petzall, 1979
and Markey, 1994 in Australia). While there have been some
exceptions to this (see Saville, 1967; Musson, 1990; GaHan, 1955),
the dominant argument suggests peak bodies either do or should
elevate the 'political'. Moreover, many of the authors argue that this
is a necessary 'subordination' ofthe industrial to political activities.
Industrial concerns are seen to be more the appropriate responsibility
or territory of individual unions, rather than the peak inter-union
bodies.
Politics and political lobbying are regarded as the province of
the inter-union bodies, with them being variously described as "the
political arm of the workers in the state" or as "agencies promoting
the political interests of labor" (Taft, 1968,p. 3 and p. 248). In
addition, such roles could be regarded as naturally occurring. Markey
not only argues that they were "fundamental to the [NSW) Labour
Council's rationale from the outset", but that "by their very nature
[peak union councils] also tend to assume significant political roles
from the start" (Markey, 1994, p. 131 and p. 36, emphasis added).
Furthermore, this elevation of political over industrial is premised
on a particular form of politics: was it lobbying over legislative
reforms, as suggested by Taft, party political activities (after the
formation of labour parties in the UK and Australia), or broader
political and social issues? The emphasis on the political, and
separation of the industrial, was consistent with promotion of
labourism, whereas adherents of socialism sought to maintain the
connection between the political and the industrial (see Stevens, 1997
and Markey, 1994). The consequence was that not aU political
activities were deemed appropriate (evident both in the literature
and in practice), with parliamentary politics being elevated above
what would be defined as political from a revolutionary socialist
perspective. In the late 1940s, the Australian Railway Union (ARU)
Victorian branch's Communist Secretary J.J. Brown referred to the
'cap in hand' [political lobbying) approach ofthe THC, compared to
direct action as distinguishing between the two. This could be
contrasted with Markey's assertion that with labourism in NSW
relying on the relationship between the Labor Council and the
Australian Labor Party (ALP): "The Council's industrial role has
generally been subordinated to the political needs of the ALP, in
order to maintain ... broader advantages" (Markey, 1994, p. 518).
Reaping the 'fruits of office' meant the subordination of industrial
activities was made for pragmatic reasons and tangible results. The
extent to which this could be maintained relied on the ability of the
NSW Labor Council to point to the benefits and in part also depended
on an ALP able to deliver to its union counterparts. If the success of
labourism and hence the dominance of the political was reliant on
an ALP capable of securing office, then the elevation of this form of
the political is more circumstance-specific than the standard accounts
might lead us to believe.
When exploring the political/industrial functions of peak bodies
then we need to be aware of two factors - the different interpretations
of political and that the emphasis on political may depend on the
strategy pursued and achieved by a political party. What is understood
as Labourism OZ style ala NSW is not always directly transposable
to other states, most notably in the case of Victoria where the
absence of the ALP from holding office created a markedly
different political landscape (a majority ALP government first

being gained in 1952, lasting only till 1955, and then again out of
office till 1982). This is encapsulated in the view of Vic Stout, THC
Secretary from 1938 to 1964 who, at the time of the 1955 ALP split,
argued that the party "is expected to serve them" (2.11.55);
furthermore he asserted that the ALP was a party" ... operating for a
party purpose to serve the organised workers. We mean to see it will
be such a party. It should have no other purpose" (c24.1 0.55).
Oflate we've had quite an amount of politics on our industrial gruel.
We are essentially industrial. Because we are industrial we can't
escape the flavour of politics that are intruded in our lives (by those
seeking to influence IlS) (Stout, 3KZ broadcast, 6.12.55).
Stout was hardly a radical, but for him, the cleansing of the party
deemed necessary in the split was a decision made "without regard
to the loss of government" (c24.10.55). Clearly for Stout, the party
was there to serve the unions. In short, state specificities need to be
taken into account.
In the industrial relations literature, the attempts to explain why
peak bodies function as they do are also less than fully satisfying.
The key concern here is 'authority'. The authority debate requires
examination as it does, at the very least, focus attention on the
relationship between a peak body and its affiliates but this analysis
rests primarily on that of the ACTU. We are then faced with
explanations of national inter-union peak bodies, which mayor may
not be appropriately applied at, or extended to other levels in the
union movement.
Martin (1962) compares the ACTU with the British Trade Union
Congress (TUC). For him, the 'ultimate test' of internal authority
lies in the degree to which the affiliate autonomy was restricted by
the functions ofthe inter-union body "in ways that [affiliates] regard
as important" (1962, p. 14). Affecting union strategy and tactics, the
encroachment on "the procedural as well as the substantive raisons
d'etre of its affiliated unions, and therefore on the most vital aspects
of their autonomy" was argued to clearly differentiate the degree of
authority of the ACTU compared to the TUC, particularly that
exercised over industrial matters (p. 15).
Dabscheck (1977) has taken issue with Martin's analysis,
particularly the notion of the 'ultimate test', questioning the relevance
of a test which, he argues, was rarely invoked. The internal authority
of the ACTU, Dabscheck asserts, was conferred by the arbitration
system, supporting his contention that the role of a peak body "can
only be understood in the context of the industrial relations system
of which it happens to be a member" (p. 389). He, however, moves
away from using the term 'authority', introducing firstly' leadership'
and secondly 'reliance' as alternative concepts to, or proxies for
authority. Use of 'reliance' appears influenced by Howard's
dependency thesis (1977), with the dominance of the arbitral system
providing the basis for ACTU authority over affiliates. The
relationship with the arbitration system produced what Dabscheck
calls 'calculative' or 'instrumental' unions, with this instrumentality
extending to the relations with the peak body: when the union 'needs'
or 'relies on' the ACTU, the peak body has a greater role or
importance (p. 400). This would dissipate when levels of reliance
recede.
The consequence of Dabs check's analysis is that external factors
assume a dominance whereby the relationship between affiliates and
an inter-union body are constructed primarily by the external
environment. Consequently, agency of both affiliates and the interunion body appears nullified, the inter-union body is cast in a
dependent role and both the peak body and affiliates are treated as
homogeneous entities neglecting, at the least, the impact of internal
union dynamics. In the context of the THC, contestation of
authority, or Dabscheck's 'reliance', was a common feature
of Disputes Committee meetings, which reflected affiliate
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strategy and thus attitudes towards the exercise of THC authority.
The factional interplay found within the THC, within and between
the leadership group and key affiliates, it can be argued, affected the
degree to which affiliates would allow themselves to be 'reliant' on
the THe. Greater attention needs to be given to both the internal
context of the shaping of power and authority, and the complexity of
relationships found within the peak body.
With the negation of agency, the inter-union body becomes
curiously constrained in terms of its power relations with affiliates
with little said about the capacity ofthe peak body to 'construct' the
needs of an affiliate or to make affiliates more or less 'reliant'. With
the willingness of unions to bring disputes to the THC Disputes
Committee when their officials were, on other matters, in conflict
with the THC leadership demonstrates the THC had a capacity to
construct amongst affiliates a notion of reciprocal benefit and interdependence. This was tangible given that disputes commonly
involved other affiliates, and a negotiated, agreed strategy was usually
necessary. Restoring a sense of agency and independent action of
the peak body is important in understanding the capacity ofthe peak
body to influence the relationship with affiliates, which indeed is
the context of much of the contlict experienced.
Griffin (1994) explores the (still limited) literature on authority
and again is most interested in explaining the growth of the internal
authority of the ACTU. Just as Martin examined the authority of the
ACTU by arguing the significance of a particUlar time period (the
1950s), Griffin does so as well, drawing his evidence from the early
1980s to early 1990s, the time period now referred to as the Accord
years. This enables the drawing of a convincing picture of the ACTU's
expanding authority, evident through a number of factors
(inclusiveness, changing structure and reduced factionalism,
leadership and policy development as internal factors with the
external factors of economic/political environment and the role of
the state) in that time period. Its usefulness as a model for other
inter-union bodies is limited both because of the opacity ofthe actual
exercise of authority by the ACTU (see page p. 87, 88, 100) but also
the historical specificity of the analysis, recognised in at least in
passing by Griffin:
So long as the consensus view remains that a strong peak council
helps affiliates to maximise their chances of achieving their goals
significant authority will reside with the ACTU. Changed perceptions
on the part of the affiliates, perhaps caused by extemal factors ...
could clearly result in a lesser role, and hence reduced authority for
the ACTU (p. 100).
These comments reinforce Martin's earlier observation of
authority resting on the willingness ofthe affiliates to cede and abide
by such levels of authority, as well as being reminiscent of
Dabscheck's dependency or reliance concept. In and of itself, then,
the peak body has limited authority (though this does seem to
contradict Griffin's earlier depiction of the ACTU's authority). Just
as it can be said that unions rely on their members for their power so
too, it is clear, do inter-union bodies. Another set of questions then
arise: what power does the peak body have to maintain levels of
authority, how is that consensus view maintained and how does the
power of the peak body mediate against external, as well as internal,
factors which could erode its formal authority? By shifting beyond
the focus on authority to include broader considerations of bases of
power, a more complex picture of the relations between the peak
body and affiliates could be constructed.
Arguably power, not authority, is the more useful concept for
advancing our understanding. Despite this, the absence of discussion
of the concept of power in the industrial relations literature
has been frequently noted, most recently by Kelly (1998, p.
9). While the discussion of authority in the inter-union body

literature at least partly fills this gap, applying an understanding of
power which enables a disaggregation of power will extend the
analysis. Hyman (1975) provides one of the more explicit
considerations of power in the broader industrial relations literature.
Hyman's discussion of power in unions leads him to distinguish
between 'power over' and 'power for'. Initially, he characterises
'power over' as arising in relationships of conflict, citing the
employment relationship where the power held by either is at the
expense of the other. 'Power for' is regarded as "as a resource used
in the service of collective power" (p. 26). Trade unions act to enable
workers to develop 'power for' so as to exert 'power over' employers
(p. 27). Hyman characterises trade unions as "an agency and a
medium of power", and in this context it is recognised that unions
themselves involve processes ofinternal, as well as external, control.
As well as unions exerting external 'power over', they themselves
need to exert internal 'power over' members so as to seek and increase
to achieve their collective interests, 'power for' (p. 65). Given the
lack of autonomy and power in the workers' employment relationship,
'power over' is regarded as "the prerequisite of concerted action"
(p. 68). But, as Hyman adds, members also have the capacity, through
internal democratic processes, to exert 'power over' their union
officials, with electoral mechanisms being the most evident (pp. 734).
Hyman's notion of 'power over' and 'power for' can be applied
to the study of peak bodies and their affiliates, enabling an
examination of the pressures for division and those for unity, and
how these may be manifested: how lumping is protected and
advanced and tensions for splitting reconciled and mediated. While
Hyman applied his notion of 'power for' / 'power over' to individual
unions, it is a particularly useful concept to use to explore the
dynamics within an inter-union body. 'Power over' becomes the
means through which authority will be examined, but it also enables
the complexity of power relationships to be examined more closely.
The duality encompassed by the tension between the two aspects of
power reinforces the complexity of power relations to be found in
practice, as well as accommodation and contestation between these
two reflecting the pressures for lumping and splitting.
Hyman, from a workplace perspective, spoke of 'power over' in
terms of job control:
A union can wield effective job control only if, and to the extent
that, it can mobilise disciplined collective action on the part of its
members. Such collective discipline is in tum dependent on members'
willingness to subordinate, where necessary, their own immediate
wishes or interests to conunon rules and collective decisions (Hyman,
1975, p. 65).
Can this be extrapolated to the inter-union level? Is greater capacity
to secure job control what unions seek from affiliation with an interunion body? Certainly disputes with employers and the state could
be understood to be contests over job control and in as far as interunion bodies co-ordinated action, then 'power for' would be based
onjob control. But Hyman also drew attention to the lack of' genuine
autonomy' of individual employees; this is manifestly not the case
when we are looking at affiliates. They do have autonomy and can,
and do, wage the battle over job control without the intercession of
an inter-union body. Clearly greater strength may be derived but
they are not dependent on the inter-union body to achieve their
objectives. Although this necessarily changes the power relationship
between the inter-union body's leadership and the affiliates from the
one experienced between unions and their members, nevertheless, it
can be argued that affiliates derive a greater capacity to secure job
control when there is inter-union support and assistance: in
negotiations, in strike support and financial assistance, with
prevention of strike breakers.

'Power for' is less well explained and is referred to as enabling
'collective power' to achieve 'collective interests', with few
examples, other than pertaining to wages, given. Certainly there
would have been substantial debate over what constituted those
collective 'interests' within a particular union. Moving to the level
of an inter-union body, the need to determine and agree on what was
regarded as collective 'interests' for the affiliates as well as the interunion body itself would have posed a more difficult and often fraught
task. This returns us to the issue of union purpose.
The complexity of the exercise of power over must recognise
significance of the composition of the leadership of inter-union bodies
(as with affiliates), and the impact ofindividual agency. Relationships
between inter-union body leaders and key union affiliate leaders will
affect power relations within the inter-union bodies. Despite the
limited discussion in Hyman, the resonance ofthe concepts of power
over and power for an analysis of unions and the capacity to
extrapolate to inter-union bodies provide a viable means for the
exploration of power relationships in the latter.
Any analysis of the power relations to be found in theTHC needs
to recognise the tiered nature of those relations. The THC seeks to
exert 'power over' affiliates so as to exert 'power for' those affiliates.
To do so, it also requires affiliates to exert 'power over' members so
as to exert 'power for' those affiliates and their members .. This has
led the THC not only to discipline union affiliates through suspension
and, more rarely, disaffiliation, but to expect affiliates to discipline
members. That affiliates had to take responsibility for members'
actions was made patently clear, time and again. Pursuit of 'power
for' could not be compromised by those unwilling or unable to submit
to 'power over'. This also meant that the Disputes Committee's
capacity to exert 'power over' relied, in part, to unions themselves
exerting power over members, so that collective 'power for' could
be realised.
Although instances of punitive action were few; more common
was verbal chastising, a rhetoric of castigation. Some examples made
this plain. For instance, after repeated disregard of Disputes
Committee decisions, the Motor Transport Union was told, in no
uncertain terms, that "it was not a matter of what the Motor Transport
Union members lose or gain it was a question of giving effect to the
decision ofthe Disputes Committee (THC Executive mins 24.3, 31.3,
17.11,7.12.60). Evidently the Motor Transport Union should have
been more assiduous in ensuring members' compliance: they failed
to exercise sufficient power over their members. In another case,
unions whose members repudiated a Disputes Committee decision,
were bluntly told that "this is an intolerable position and cannot be
allowed to pass without expecting the unions to see that their members
loyally obey the [Disputes Committee] decision" (Gas & Fuel dispute,
THC circular to unions, 18.10.63, emphasis added). Occasions arose
though when rhetoric was deemed insufficient by the THC leadership.
Thus disciplinary action was taken against the Clerks Union for not
only failing to ensure that members respected a Disputes Committee
decision, but for not taking disciplinary action against non-compliant
members. The THC's 'power over' hand stretched far in this case,
the union being told that "this [THC] Executive expects it to take
severe disciplinary action against the members ... and that this
Executive would require much stronger action than a severe
reprimand could provide" (letter from THC to FCU, 16.11.62,
emphasis added). The Executive motion to suspend the union was a
strongly worded one: the actions of the FCU members described as
"a despicable act of anti-unionism calculated to sabotage industrial
action designed to advance and protect the welfare and interests of
their fellow workers". More significantly, the union was to
understand that the rules of that Union became subordinate
to those of the Council that are appropriate to affiliation and

that the Clerks' Union, as an affiliated Organisation must comply
with decisions of the Council and its appropriate committees (THC
Executive mins, 2.5.63, emphasis added).
So it was the Clerks Union that transgressed the acceptable and
so invoked the THC's discipline in the mid 1950s and early 60s:
where the imposition of the THC's 'power over' appeared to affront
their view of union autonomy.
Splitting tendencies aside (for they should not be minimised),
the 'power for' underpinned by a commitment to lumping saw, in
the late 1950s and early 60s, the ARU and THC working closely
together in both advancing power for in the rail industry, but also in
the eyes of the ARU on broader movement issues as well. After
claiming that a dispute was "not being led by the ARU. It is led by
the THC Disputes Committee", ARU Secretary Brown asserted that
"The railway service grant dispute is a genuine fight by the official
Trade Union Movement to force an improvement in wages" (ARU
Gazette, April 1960, p. 2). In 1961 he declared, "Special attention
must be paid to the work of the MTHC. Good general working class
activity is now a feature of the struggle for better wages and
conditions" (Secretary's report to theARU Armual Conference, 1959,
p. 8; 1961, p. 7), while in 1963, the view was that "The good
progressive policy which it has pursued on all questions ... has put
the [THC] in a leading position in the workers' struggles" (Secretary's
report to 1963 Annual Conference, pp. 8-9).
Finally it should be mentioned that state peak bodies are also
involved in a power relationship with national peak bodies. As a
state branch of the ACTU, the THC could also experience the ACTU
exerting 'power over' it, as well as over the same affiliates at a federal
level. This federal/state divide also affects the ability of the THC to
exert 'power over' their affiliates. With state branches also subject
to the exercise of 'power over' by their federal bodies, the authority
of the THC to exercise 'power over' a particular affiliate may be
contested and constrained. In its relationship with the ALP, the THC
too has sought to exert power over the political wing of the labour
movement, so 'power for' the industrial wing can be maximised.
This means that when looking at the political dimension, it is not
just the exercise of 'power over' affiliates to ensure 'power for' the
ALP is protected.
The potential for conflict, and argument regarding how 'power
over' should be exercised, therefore is always present, thus creating
the potential for splitting. The rationale for exerting 'power over',
so that 'power for' can be achieved, means however that there can
be agreement or consent (whether complete or partial, grudging or
wholehearted). In general, the object of exerting 'power over' to
enable 'power for' elevates the push for lumping. Under some
circumstances, however, debate about the balance between how much
'power over' is necessary to pursue 'power for' creates splits. A multidimensional notion of power is required in order to unravel and
explore the inter-relationships found within inter-union bodies:
between the leadership and affiliates, between affiliates, within the
leadership group, between the inter-union body and bodies with
which itself is affiliated such as a national peak body, relationships
with political parties.

References
Primary

Australian Railway Union (Victorian branch), Gazette, April 1960.
Australian Railway Union (Victorian branch), Secretary's report to the
ARU Annual Conference, 1959, 1961, 1963.
Stout, V. 1955, 3KZ broadcasts, various.
Trades Hall Council, Dispute Committee minutes and related
correspondence, 1962-3.

Trades Hall Council, Executive minutes, 1960, 1963.

Secondary
Cannon, J. ed, 1980, The Historian at Work, London, Allen & Unwin.
Clinton, A. 1977, The Trade Union Rank and File: Trades Councils in

Britain 1900-1940, Manchester University
Press, Manchester.
Cohen, L. 1991, "Reflections on the Making of Making a New Deal",

Labor History, 32.
Dabscheck, B. 1977, "The Internal Authority ofthe ACTU", Journal of

Industrial Relations, 19(4).
Ellem, B. & Shields, J. 1996, "Why do Union form Peak Bodies? The
Case of the Barrier Industrial Council", Journal of Industrial
Relations, 38(3).
Gahan, P. 1996, "Did Arbitration Make for Dependent Unionism?!
Evidence from Historical Case Studies", Journal of Industrial

Relations, 38(4).
Gardner, M. 1989, "Union Strategy: A Gap in Union Theory", in
Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations Perspective, eds B. Ford
& D. Plowman, 2nd edition, Macmillan, South Melbourne.
Gollan, R. 1955, "The Trade Unions and Labour Parties, 1980 -4",

Historical Studies, 7(25).
Griffin, G. 1994, "The Authority of the ACTU", The Economic and

Labour Relations Review, 5(1).
Hexter, J.H. 1975, Times Literary Supplement, 24 October, pp. 1250-52
Howard, W. 1977, "Australian Trade Unions in the Context of Union
Theory," Journal of Industrial Relations, 19(3).
Hyman, R. 1975, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction,
Macmillan, London.
Kellaway, C. 1973, The Melbourne Trades Hall Council: Its Origins

I

+

and Political Significance, 1855 - 1889, unpublished PhD thesis,
La Trobe University.
Kelly, J. 1998, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization,
Collectivism and Long Waves, London, Routledge.
Leier, M. 1995, Red Flags and Red Tape: The Making of a Labour
Bureaucracy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Markey, R. 1994, In Case of Oppression: The Life and Times of the
Labor Council of New South Wales, Pluto Press, Sydney.
Martin, R., 1962, "The Authority of Trade Union Centres: The Australian
Council of Trade Unions and the British Trades Union Congress,
Journal ofIndustrial Relations, 4(1).
Musson, A.E. 1990, "British Trade Unions 1800 - 1875", in British Trade
Unions and Labour History A Compendium, ed. L. A. Clarkson,
Macmillan, London.
O'Connor, E. 1989, A Labour History of Wateiford, Waterford Trades
Council, Kildare.
Petzall, S. 1979, The political and industrial role of the VTHC 19271946, unpublished PhD thesis, La Trobe University.
Saville, J. 1967, "Trades Councils and the Labour Movement to 1900 ",
Bulletin of the Society for the Study ofLabour History, No.14.
Stevens, R. 1997, "Containing Radicalism: The Trades Union Congress
Organisation Department and Trades Councils, 1928-1953", Labour
History Review, 62.
Taft, P. 1957, TheA.F. ofL. in the Times ofGompers, Harper and Brothers,
New York.
Taft, P. 1968, Labor Politics American Style: The California State
Federation of Labor, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Wallihan, J. 1985, Union Government and Organisation in the United
States, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington.

EJ

